The Story About Clinton’s Impeachment by LaRue, L. H.
LARUE_FMT.DOC 11/14/00 10:43 AM
THE STORY ABOUT CLINTON’S
IMPEACHMENT
L. H. LARUE*
I
WHAT WAS THE STORY?
In the oral version of their presentations, the participants in this symposium
generally prefaced their remarks with descriptions of their service in
government.  They wished to acknowledge their biases and to admit how the
jobs they held had shaped their perspectives.  So perhaps I should also state
how my experience has shaped my views of impeachment, especially because
my perspective on impeachment differs from that of my co-participants.
Generally speaking, the other participants served in high government positions,
and so they think in terms of policy, but I served as a trial lawyer, so I come to
impeachment asking the trial lawyer’s question:  What is the story?
In the debate over impeachment, the prosecutors thought that President
Clinton’s actions represented a threat to the rule of law.  The defenders denied
this charge.  Both sides agreed that the story was about the rule of law, and the
articles to which I am responding employ the same metaphors.  My thesis is that
the prosecutors, the defenders, and those who spoke at the symposium all chose
the wrong story; had I been the prosecutor, I would have told a story about
breach of trust.  As events transpired, the defenders were delighted to be telling
the wrong story.  The prosecutors were incompetent enough to choose the rule
of law as their theme, and the defenders were glad to join issue on this
favorable terrain.  One wonders why the prosecutors made such a bad choice.
Perhaps the prosecutors avoided the breach-of-trust issue because this
theme would have acted as a double-edged sword.  They might have thought it
easy to demonstrate that President Clinton was not worthy of our trust, but
perhaps they did not wish to call attention to their own untrustworthiness.  The
Republicans, who comprised a majority of the House Judiciary Committee,
failed to earn our trust because of their irresponsible behavior.  They released
the report by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr (“Starr Report”) without
editing out irrelevancies; they compromised the tradition of grand jury
confidentiality by releasing transcripts; they failed to adopt a clear set of
procedures before beginning the process; and they failed to conduct an
independent inquiry.  They then compounded these mistakes by sending
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thirteen Members of the House of Representatives to the Senate to manage
their presentation.  The thirteen Members made the Keystone Kops look
efficient.
Because the House Republicans failed to demonstrate that they deserved
our trust, it is no surprise that they also failed to show that President Clinton
did not.  One would have thought that it would have been easy, that making the
case that President Clinton was untrustworthy would not have been beyond
their competence.  But it was.  Their mistake seems to have been twofold.  First,
they focused on sex by releasing the unedited Starr Report, which distracted
public attention from President Clinton’s acts of perjury and obstruction of
justice.1  Second, when they tried to switch the topic away from sex, and back to
perjury and obstruction of justice, they chose to describe President Clinton’s
acts as a threat to the rule of law rather than as a breach of trust.  Their
misplaced emphasis on the rule of law crippled their attempts at persuasion by
making them sound rigid, dogmatic, and abstract.
If the story of President Clinton’s perjuries and his obstructions of justice
had been told as a story about breach of trust, the Republican House Managers
would have had several advantages; most importantly they could have shed the
handicap of abstractness.  Their talk about the rule of law was necessarily
abstract because to argue that President Clinton’s perjuries were a threat, they
had to generalize.  The House Managers had to argue the theme “what if
everybody . . . ,” which ultimately led away from what President Clinton did.
By moving the argument away from the details, their rhetoric became ever less
incisive, and ever more pompous.
One possible response to my assertionthe House Republicans were
foolish to have cast their charges as a story about the rule of lawis to gasp in
astonishment, “What could be more important than the rule of law?”  When I
made my remarks at the symposium on September 24, 1999, a member of the
audience stated, “I find it rather disturbing that anyone would suggest that
perjury is not a serious enough threat to the rule of law to warrant
impeachment and removal from office.”2  I responded that this astonishment is
natural and understandable, indeed inevitable, to anyone who has been
educated into the legal imagination.  However, this line of thinking assumes
that the legal imagination should govern.  We all know that the public did not
judge President Clinton’s perjuries to be serious, and I surmise that they did not
judge him harshly because they sympathized with his motives for lyingto
conceal sexual trespasses.  The public could forgive those motives.  To be sure,
by the standards of the law, President Clinton’s motives for his perjuries were
irrelevant, but one must remember that our Constitution begins, “We, the
1. There was, and continues to be, much obfuscation on this point, but anyone who wishes to
confirm the fact that President Clinton committed perjury and obstructed justice need only consult
RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
PRESIDENT CLINTON 36-56 (1999).
2. This is not an exact quote, but it accurately sets forth the gist of the query.
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People, . . .”  One should also remember what President Lincoln did not say:
President Lincoln did not hold out government “of the lawyers, by the lawyers,
for the lawyers” as a worthy ideal.3  If we judge President Clinton by the
standards of legal justice, then of course he should have been impeached and
convicted, but if we judge him by the standards of popular justice, then the
outcome is rather more doubtful.
II
THE REASON FOR TALKING ABOUT BREACH OF TRUST
Judge Posner, in his wonderful book on the affair, points out the contrast
between judging by legal justice and judging by popular justice, and he
illustrates the contrast by presenting different narratives of the event.
Even after unsubstantiated conjectures (such as Starr’s being obsessed with sex, or
Clinton’s having tried to get Lewinsky a job so that she wouldn’t tell the truth in the
Paula Jones case) are put to one side, there are two diametrically opposed narratives
to choose between.  In one, a reckless, lawless, immoral President commits a series of
crimes in order to conceal a tawdry and shameful affair, crimes compounded by a
campaign of public lying and slanders.  A prosecutor could easily draw up a thirty-
count indictment against the President.  In the other narrative, the confluence of a
stupid law (the independent counsel law), a marginal lawsuit begotten and nursed by
political partisanship, a naïve and imprudent judicial decision by the Supreme Court in
that suit, and the irresistible human impulse to conceals one’s sexual improprieties,
allows a trivial sexual escapade (what Clinton and Lewinsky called “fooling around”
or “messing around”) to balloon into a grotesque and gratuitous constitutional drama.
The problem is that both narratives are correct.4
Posner is surely right that both narratives are true, and he also gives us some
valuable clues about the differences between the two narratives.  Note that the
second narrativethe narrative of popular justiceis longer than the first
narrative.5  This difference in relative length is no accident; legal narratives are
always shorter than such popular narratives as novels or biographies.  A legal
narrative’s relative brevity is caused by the legal system’s attempt to narrow and
focus the issues in a dispute.  As Posner puts it:  “[T]he law . . . tries to narrow
the focus of disputes and [to] exclude much that gives a legal dispute its color
and urgency and emotional impact.”6  The law’s attempt “to narrow . . . and
exclude” is admirable, particularly because it makes the process more
manageable.  In addition to such practical considerations, there are moral and
normative advantages to the law’s attempt to limit its focus.  If the issues are
few and narrow, then there is some hope that they can be decided objectively,
and objectivity is a virtue in the law.  Furthermore, narrowing the focus can
enable other virtues that are even more important than objectivity.  When the
law succeeds in limiting its focus, which it does not always do, lawyers and
3. Compare Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
4. POSNER, supra note 1, at 92-93.
5. The passage “a reckless . . . slanders” contains 29 words, whereas the passage “the
confluence . . . drama” contains 65 words.
6. POSNER, supra note 1, at 93.
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judges can be more modest in their claims to knowledge, which is a
considerable virtue.  Because lawyers and judges regularly overestimate their
knowledge and intelligence, narrowing the focus has the considerable
advantage of reducing the excess of false pretensions that mar our legal
discourse.
Yet, it is surely implausible to believe that we can narrow the scope of an
impeachment proceeding so as to exclude everything that gives it “color and
urgency and emotional impact.”  One should remember the philosopher’s
dictum that “ought” implies “can,” that is, it makes no sense to say that we
“ought to do” what we “cannot do.”  If we cannot exclude popular instincts
from an impeachment inquiry, if we cannot narrow the focus, then we must find
ways to include popular virtues while excluding popular vices.  Posner is correct
that “popular justice” has its dangers,7 but the remedy is not to retreat to some
form of legal justice.
If one uses the metaphor of breach of trust to tell the story, then there is
some hope that one can unite legal virtues with the popular virtues.  If breach of
trust is the issue, then violations of law are relevant, but not decisive; one can
focus on the law while insisting that there are also larger issues at stake.  One
can begin the inquiry with the commonplace notion that public officials hold the
power of their office in trust for the public.  The authority of the trustee, the
terms of the trust, is specified by law,8 but we can use our understanding about
the purposes of the trust to argue over the circumstances in which a violation of
law is justified because the trustee is trying to serve the purpose of the trust.
III
HOW DOES ONE TALK THE LANGUAGE OF TRUST?
If one wishes to think about the comparative advantage of discussing
impeachment with the language of trust, then it is desirable to have some
particulars.  To be particular, one can compare the presidencies of Nixon and
Clinton with Lincoln’s.  To be sure, this exercise compares two pygmies with a
giant, and it may be difficult to draw such a comparison.  However, the
difficulty is itself illuminating.
In President Nixon’s case, a burglary led to obstruction of justice.  In
President Clinton’s case, a sexual affair led to obstruction of justice.  Both of
these cases of obstruction of justice resembled rowdy boys at a Sunday school
picnic, compared to the magnitude of the illegalities that marked Lincoln’s
presidency.  Scholars disagree about which of President Lincoln’s official
actions went beyond his scope of authority and outside the law.  James Randall,
7. See id. at 92, 94.
8. There is one caveat: The positive law may be unclear about the scope of authority.  As a
general matter, there is a mix of both clarity and vagueness, but constitutional law generally has this
defect.  Article II is certainly vague.  The only explicit duty is the duty to faithfully execute the law,
which can be supplemented by the terms of the prescribed oath, wherein the President promises to
faithfully execute the office and to defend the Constitution.
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who is rather traditional in his views, offers the following as a summary of
controversial acts that were probably illegal:
He carried his executive authority to the extent of freeing the slaves by proclamation,
setting up a whole scheme of state-making for the purpose of reconstruction,
suspending the habeas corpus privilege, proclaiming martial law, enlarging the army
and navy beyond the limits fixed by existing law, and spending public money without
congressional appropriation.9
President Lincoln also acted in ways that offend our beliefs about freedom
of the press.  To quote Randall again, his measures against the press included
“the suppression of certain newspapers, the military control of the telegraph,
the seizure of particular editions, the withholding of papers from the mails, and
the arrest of editors.”10  In light of President Lincoln’s acts, imagine the
following colloquy between a skeptic (“Q”) and myself (“A”):
Q. Do you agree that Randall was correct in his judgments on illegality?
A. I quibble here and there, and it is important to note that there have
been changes in constitutional theory since Randall’s time.  Under modern law,
the legality of President Lincoln’s actions would require more analysis.  Overall,
however, Randall’s judgments are sound, and especially so if one judges
President Lincoln by the law of his day.
Q. You also agree that the scope and magnitude of President Lincoln’s
illegalities far exceed those of Presidents Nixon or Clinton?
A. Of course.
Q. Then how can you condemn my man, who has done so much less?
A.  Your man is no Lincoln.
In light of this hypothetical colloquy, one should consider whether
Presidents Nixon and Clinton can be barred from citing President Lincoln for
reasons other than that they are not President Lincoln.  The Civil War was
unique; President Lincoln was unique; and so the rejoinder“Your man is no
Lincoln”is rational, albeit the rationality of the rejoinder does not seem
particularly legal in its overtones.  If one can use the concepts of trusts, then one
can distinguish the cases by noting that President Lincoln’s illegalities were
intended to benefit the nation, whereas Presidents Nixon’s and Clinton’s were
not.  I hope that I need not, at this late date, argue the case for President
Lincoln.11  As for the case against President Nixon, I am in print and will rest
with a citation to my book.12  What about President Clinton?
President Clinton did breach his trust, in that his perjuries and obstructions
of justice were for his personal benefit and not for the benefit of the nation.
One might suppose that there were three categories of personal benefits:  First,
he wished to enjoy his sensual pleasures without risk or challenge; second, he
9. JAMES RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 514 (1951).
10. Id. at 520.
11. Randall himself was willing to defend the justice and propriety of President Lincoln’s actions,
even though he doubted their legality.
12. See L.H. LARUE, POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF THE WATERGATE AFFAIR
(1988).
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wanted to preserve a relationship with his wife; and third, he wanted to preserve
a relationship with his daughter.  Each of these three types of benefits inured to
his personal benefit; none inured to the benefit of the nation.  In short, there is
no doubt that he committed an illegal act for personal benefit.  Did he use the
power of his office to commit these acts?  He did not need the power of his
office to lie under oath, but the power of his office did, in fact, impede the
investigation, not least by a well-organized campaign of vilification.13
Given the breach of trust, the question remains whether the breach
warranted his removal from office.  In other words, the question that follows
upon identifying the breach is a question of “how much is too much.”  One
need not hold a President to standards of perfection, but if one were to say that
every breach of trust, however singular, were grounds for removal from office,
one would be requiring perfection.  To move from perfection to reality requires
one to analyze the details of his offenses.  One needs to ask whether the breach
is characteristic of this presidency.  Is it part of a pattern?  Is it likely to recur?
What sort of harms were caused?  What extenuating circumstances are
relevant?  These more detailed questions must be asked if one believes that a
breach alone is insufficient to warrant removal.
When asking these more detailed questions, we have moved the topic
beyond the boundaries of a strictly legal justice; we are now trying to combine
legal justice with popular justice by way of the metaphors of a breach of trust.
When combining the legal and the popular, getting the proper mix of substance
and procedure right can be especially tricky.  If the substance is breach of trust,
what should be the forum, and who should have jurisdiction?  Because the
nation is the beneficiary of the President’s trusteeship, then perhaps “We, the
People” should act as the ultimate judge.
There are two salient questions in impeachment.  In addition to asking a
substantive questionwhat standard should govern? one must also ask a
procedural and jurisdictional questionwho should have authority to define
and apply the standard?  Does the community of lawyers have any special
expertise?  When a matter falls within the strictly legal realm, lawyers can
knowingly depart from public opinion; it is our responsibility to do so.  In this
realm of impeachment, however, lawyers cannot claim any special authority.
The people did not want President Clinton removed from office, and the people
have a legitimate jurisdiction that lawyers lack.  It is also true that our
representatives and senators will normally believe that it is in their self-interest
to cast votes that reflect their constituents’ wishes.  In the end, the impeachment
trial seems to have worked out that way, and because I am willing to concede
that the people should have the final say, I have no grounds for asserting that
injustice was committed.
13. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 27, 141.
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IV
AN ASSESSMENT BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION
Were my personal views relevantand I have argued above that they are
notI would have to confess that my judgment on President Clinton would be
far harsher than the public’s.  Yet, even though I was repulsed by his sniveling
self-pity and by the campaign of slanders against his accusers, I would not have
voted to remove him from office.  To my mind, his sexual affairs should not be
public business, and furthermore, I am old-fashioned enough to believe that any
man who has been fortunate enough to enjoy a woman’s favors is duty bound to
keep his privilege secret and even, if necessary, to lie to do so.  To be sure, there
is a difference between lying and lying under oath.  Given the seriousness of
lying under oath, I am forced to balance my disgust with his perjury against my
disgust with the legal system that investigates sexual matters and drives people
to lie about them.14
A reasonable judgment is that both President Clinton and those who
pursued him breached their public trust:  Both used the legal and constitutional
powers granted to them in ways that were not directed toward the nation’s
benefit.  Given these two sets of breaches of trust, which breach threatens to
cause the greater long-term damage to the commonweal?  Fortunately, we need
not rest our judgments about harm on uncertain predictions about the future;
we have historical experience to use as a guide.  Since Watergate, numerous
investigation of public officials, under both Democratic and Republican
Presidents, have been conducted that resemble the investigation that ensnared
President Clinton.  The historical record of these investigations has been
dismal.15  The historical lesson has seemed so self-evident that the law
empowering the independent counsel investigations was permitted to expire.16
Given the history, one can make a judgment.  If having this sort of
investigation has been more harmful than the acts investigated, then the
breaches of trust in conducting the impeachment were worse than the acts
impeached.  Consequently, the refusal to convict was just.
14. Consider the case of Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros.  An
investigation by an independent counsel drove him from office; his offense was lying to the FBI about
how much money he had paid and was paying to his mistress.  This was not perjury, but it was one of
the many statutory offenses that fall under the general umbrella of obstruction of justice.  I regard the
hounding of Cisneros from office as a true national disgrace.  See Bill Miller, Cisneros Pleads Guilty to
Lying to FBI Agents, $9 Million Probe Yields Fine, No Jail, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at A1.
15. Different people will have different estimates of exactly what has been dismal about the history
of these investigations.  The most general objection has been that ordinary politics has been
criminalized. From my perspective as a lawyer, what seems objectionable is the “bait and switch”
aspect.  The investigation starts with regard to an alleged offense; witnesses and targets panic; they
thrash about foolishly; in their folly, they commit obstructions of justice; the original charge is dropped,
and the prosecution goes forward on the obstructions.  In short, the investigation generates the very
offenses that it prosecutes.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA
CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP (1997).
16. See Roberto Suro, As Special Counsel Law Expires, Power Will Shift to Reno, WASH. POST,
June 20, 1999, at A6.
